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This intervention is not merely controversial or politically debatable; it is unlawful under the core rules governing the international use of force. That conclusion holds regardless of arguments based on U.S. domestic law, moral claims about Maduro鈥檚 governance, or strategic interests in the region. If international law is to retain any meaning, it must be applied consistently 鈥� even, and especially, when doing so is politically inconvenient.

I. The Illegality of the Use of Force Against Venezuela

The prohibition on the use of force is one of the foundational principles of modern international law. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter forbids states from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Only two narrow exceptions exist: self-defence under Article 51, and authorisation by the UN Security Council.

Neither applies in the case of Venezuela. Venezuela did not attack the United States, nor was there an imminent armed attack that could justify anticipatory self-defence. Likewise, there is no Security Council mandate authorising military action. On that basis alone, U.S. strikes on Venezuelan territory constitute an unlawful use of force.

The same conclusion applies to the goal of removing Nicol谩s Maduro from power. International law explicitly prohibits intervention in the internal affairs of another state, including the forcible determination of its political leadership. Whether a government is unpopular, authoritarian, or widely regarded as illegitimate does not grant other states a legal right to impose regime change through military means. 

The capture of Maduro and his wife therefore compounds these violations. Conducting arrests on foreign soil without the consent of the territorial state or authorisation by the Security Council constitutes an unlawful extraterritorial exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. Such actions also breach international human rights law, which prohibits arbitrary detention and requires adherence to established legal procedures. Kidnapping individuals across borders does not become lawful simply because it is carried out by a powerful state.

Arguments invoking benevolent motives do not alter this legal assessment. Claims that intervention is justified by drug trafficking, human rights abuses, or economic mismanagement do not create exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force. There is no recognised doctrine of a transnational 鈥渨ar on drugs鈥� that permits military attacks on other states, nor does international law generally accept unilateral humanitarian intervention as lawful. Strategic or economic interests 鈥� such as access to oil 鈥� are even more clearly excluded as legal justifications.

II. Domestic Law Is Not a Defence Under International Law

Much of the defence offered for U.S. actions rests on domestic legal arguments: U.S. criminal indictments against Maduro, executive authority memoranda permitting extraterritorial arrests, or precedents such as the 1989 invasion of Panama to capture Manuel Noriega. These arguments misunderstand the relationship between domestic and international law.

International law is explicit on this point. A state may not invoke its internal law as justification for failing to comply with its international obligations. Even if U.S. courts permit prosecution following an unlawful apprehension, and even if U.S. executive branch lawyers conclude that such actions are permissible under domestic law, this does not erase the underlying violations of international law. The state remains internationally responsible for its conduct.

Historical precedent does not cure illegality either. The fact that the United States previously invaded Panama and prosecuted Noriega does not retroactively legalise that action, nor does it create a lawful template for future interventions. Repetition of unlawful conduct does not transform it into law.

III. Maduro, Accountability, and the Limits of Lawful Enforcement

None of this is a defence of Nicol谩s Maduro or his record in office. One may simultaneously believe that Maduro should not be governing Venezuela and recognise that foreign military intervention to remove him is illegal. His government has been credibly accused of serious human rights violations, repression, and corruption. These allegations matter and international law provides mechanisms to address them.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been investigating crimes committed in Venezuela since 2018. Within the boundaries of international law, the ICC could have pursued accountability through arrest warrants, trials, and cooperation with states parties. Such processes are slow, imperfect, and politically constrained, but they are lawful. They preserve the distinction between justice and vengeance, between accountability and domination.

International law does not promise perfect outcomes. It does not guarantee that every abusive leader will be swiftly removed or punished. But its value lies precisely in its restraint: it channels power through rules, procedures, and institutions rather than raw force. Abandoning those constraints because they are frustrating or incomplete undermines the very conditions of international stability.

IV. The Cost of Disregarding International Law

The broader danger of the Venezuela intervention lies not only in its immediate consequences, but in the precedent it sets. If powerful states may unilaterally decide when international law applies and when it does not, the legal order collapses into selective enforcement and strategic convenience.

A world in which the use of force is justified by unilateral claims of necessity or moral superiority is a world of profound instability. If Venezuela can be attacked without condemnation nor consequence, there is no principled basis for objecting when other states do the same elsewhere鈥攚hether in Ukraine, Taiwan, Greenland, or beyond. Once 鈥渕ight makes right鈥� replaces legal constraint, no state, however small or distant, is truly secure.

International silence or half-hearted responses exacerbate this risk. Vague expressions of 鈥渃oncern鈥� or selective condemnation signal that violations will be tolerated when committed by allies or powerful actors. That erosion of consistency is itself corrosive to the rule of law.

V. Consistency as the Minimum Condition for Legitimacy

International law cannot survive as a menu of optional rules. Its legitimacy depends on consistent application without fear or favour. States cannot credibly condemn violations by adversaries while excusing or endorsing the same conduct by partners or themselves.

Respecting international law does not require believing it is flawless. It requires recognising that, despite its limits, it remains the only framework capable of restraining violence, protecting sovereignty, and reducing the risk of global anarchy. The alternative is not a more just world, but a more dangerous one.

The intervention in Venezuela is therefore not only about Venezuela. It is a test of whether international law remains a meaningful constraint on power, or whether it will be discarded whenever it becomes inconvenient. If the answer is the latter, the consequences will not be confined to one country or one region. They will shape the future of global order itself.

An earlier, simplified version of this analysis was published on the Substack